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1. SUMMARY: This petn presents the question as to the circum-
stances under which police officers can resume interrogation after a 
defendant has indicated a reluctance to be questioned. 
2. FACTS: Resp was convicted of felony-murder; the sentence does 
not appear from the petn. Acting on an anonymous phone tip, police arrested 
resp and brought him to the station house for i nterrogation. Resp asserts 
that the arresting officer did not immediately take him to a magistrate for 
, ,, , 
-
-
- 2 -
-
arraignment because h e f e lt he lacked sufficient information. Re s p was 
given Miranda warnings and sign ed an ac knowledgment of their r e ceipt. 
When offic e rs began to qu e stion him about robb e ries, he stated tha t he did 
not want to talk a bout robberies, whereupon the questioning ceas ed. A bout 
two hours later, resp was taken to the Homicide Bureau, where he was 
once more given Miranda w arnings. It is not clear whether offic e rs in th e 
----------=-----Homicide Division had been made aware of resp's previously expressed 
reluctance to talk. Resp once again signed an acknowledgment of receipt of 
the warnings. When he was told that his accomplice in a robbery-murder 
had confessed and laid all the blame upon him, resp confessed as to his 
participation in the crime. 
Resp' s conviction was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
which held that under Miranda once resp indicated that he would not talk about 
robberies all interrogation must cease. The Michigan CA relied on 
Westover v. United States, a companion case to Miranda, in which the 
Court invalidated a confession obtained by FBI agents after giving warning s 
but given after the defendant had been in prolonged state custody without 
i
. similar warnings. This Court stated, how ever, that warnings in a second ! interrogation removed in time and place from the first might be sufficient. 
Review was denied by the Michigan Supreme Court. 
3. CONTENTIONS: P etr contends that the Michigan CA has undul y 
extended Miranda. All petr argues is that resp was not placed under undue 
pressure and knowingly waived his rights to rematn silent. Unless the 
decision below is review ed, petr says, police will be unable to interrogate 
-
suspects for more than one crime at a time. 
--
-
-
- 3 -
-
Resp says that the result was dictated by Miranda, which says that 
once a defendant says he does not want to t?-lk all questioning must stop. 
He further says that the Michigan courts are free to apply the protection 
against self-incrimination more strictly than constitutionally required. 
4 . DISCUSSION: The opinion of the Michigan CA reveals that it 
clearly felt that it was acting under federal constitutional compulsion. EYen 
so, the issue raised by this petn turns largely on the particular facts. 
------- - --- -
There is the additional complication that the original arrest may have been 
unlawful, thus raising the question, raised in Brown v. Illinois, No. 73-6 650. 
--
about the efficacy of the warnings. 
There is a response . 
Becker Mich CA op in petn 
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-- - I On the main issue the Michigan court must be reversed. 
Suppression of a confession made in these circumstances would 
place an unnecessary and intolerable burden on police. I 
urge, however, that the holding be narrowly circumscribed to 
the facts of this case, and that whoever writes the opinion 
be careful to avoid loose language that could encourage abusive 
police practices. 
The following facts should be emphasized in the opinion: 
(1) There was no evidence of actual coercion, not even 
from the testimony of Mosley himself. 
While it is true that Miranda's prophylactic rules were 
based in part on the "inherent" coercion of custodial inter-
rogation, it is also true that the ultimate concern was with 
actual coercion. The Miranda warnings themselves should take 
care of the effects of inherent coercion - that is why the 
Court required them for all custodial interrogation. Once 
-
-the warnings are given, the concern shifts to actual coercion, 
- - -
as shown by the fact that a confession obtained after the 
warnings have been given can still be suppressed on a showing 
of actual coercion . 
I 
., 
-
--
-
The 
court can be read to undercut the argument of the preceding 
paragraph: 
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent 
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in 
any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, 
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation 
must cease. At this point he has shown that he 
intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; 
any statement taken after the person invokes his 
privilege cannot be other than the product of com-
pulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to 
cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody 
interrogation operates on· the individual to over-
come free choice in producing a statement after the 
privilege has been once invoked. Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 473-474. 
That passage appears to rest on the inevitability of compulsion, 
"subtle or otherwise," from continued questioning after invoca-
tion of the right to remain silent. But it is imp0ssible that 
the Court intended that passage to be a categorical prohibition 
of all further questioning because of inherent compulsion. 
This much is clear from another passage of Miranda: 
If the interrogation continues without the 
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, 
a heavy burden rests on the government to demon-
strate that the · defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
his right to retained or appointed counsel. 384 
U.S. at 475. 
Both the right to an attorney and the right to remain silent 
a. 
are brought home toz suspect by the Miranda warnings. If a 
statement given after invocation of one (the right to an 
attorney) can be proved vol~ntary1 then a statement given 
after invocation of the other (the right to remain silent) 
--
-
3. 
also must be capable of being proved voluntary. Invocation 
of one of the rights does not make any subsequent statement 
per se involuntary; it just impose~ a "heavy burden" on the 
------
state to prove that the subsequent statement was indeed 
-
voluntary. 
Thus, the ultimate inquiry in this case, as in all cases 
of statements given after previous invocation of the right 
to remain silent, is whether or not the statement was in fact 
voluntary. The absence of all signs of actual coercion is 
:)important factor in that determination. 
(2) The first officer to question Mosley was concerned 
(robbery), while the second officer was 
interested in a totally different and unrelated crime (an 
earlier murder). 
The Michigan court considered this case to be an example 
of "shuttling a person from one police officer to another for 
purposes of questioning and thus justifying subsequent 
interrogations after an election to remain silent.'' Cert. 
Petn. at 13. That is a misleading and perjorative 
characterization of what happened. The court's statement 
conjures up an image of one officer trying and failing to get 
information from Mosley, then taking him immediately to 
another officer who tries and, upon like failure, takes him 
on to a third, and so on. Such a practice would be coercive 
and I am confident that no Justice would allow it. It is 
important that the opinion in this case make clear the difference 
--
-
between the facts of this case and the hypothetical scene 
I have just sketched. 
4. 
A crucial fact, as I now understand the record from the 
briefs, is that Officer Cowie and Sergeant Hill were working 
independently on separate investigations. They do not appear 
to have been a team working on related crimes. (The murder 
about which Hill questioned Mosley occurred during one of a 
series of robberies that included also the robberies about 
which Cowie had tried to question Mosley. See Resp. Brief 
at 5; Petr. Brief at 4 n. 3. But even so, there is no 
indication that Cowie and Hill were working in tandem on the 
overall series of robberies). Equally important, prior to 
rnoslc~ 
the phone call to Cowie that fingered :i:±tn there was no reason 
for either, and much less both, of their investigations to 
focus on Mosley. There is no room for an inference that Cowie 
and Hill prearranged the sequence of events at the stationhouse, 
i.~., that one of them would try to crack Mosley and if he 
failed the other would have a go. All appearances indicate 
that each officer was just doing his job in good faith. 
All of that distinguishes this case from one in which 
two officers who have been working together on one case or 
related cases arrange to conduct in shifts what reasonably 
should be one interrogation. Such a ploy would be a blatant 
attempt to circumvent Miranda and apply "subtle" pressure 
to a suspect who once invokes his right to remain silent. 
The opinion should avoid loose language that could suggest 
approval of such a tactic. 
r 
-
-
-
5. 
(3) There were two complete sets of Miranda warnings, 
strict compliance with Mosley's request after the first that 
questioning cease, and no such request at all after the 
second set. 
The second complete set of Miranda warnings, coupled with 
good faith compliance with Mosley's wishes following the first, 
I 
irrnnediately distinguish this case from those in which the police~ 
at first respect a request to cease interrogation but then 
return from a few seconds to several hours later to try "just 
one more time." Those latter cases include both the ones 
where the police "refuse to take no for an answer" and keep 
hammering away at the mute suspect, and those where they leave 
the suspect alone for a long time and then drop back in 
"casually" to ask "if you've changed your mind and want to 
11 b 
. ,, 
te us a out it now. 
The first type of case - where the police refuse to take 
no for an answer - is an affront to Miranda and probably would 
always be found to involve actual coercion. The adherence to 
Mosley's request f or cessation of questioning after the first 
Miranda warnings distinguishes this case from that type. The 
second type of case - where the police come back later to see 
if the suspect has "changed his mind about talking" - is a 
closer question both as to whether the practice violates 
Miranda and whether it involves coercion. If it were held 
to do either, it would be because it smacks of a trick1 an 
attempt to confuse the suspect: whereas the police left him 
--
6. 
alone at first, now they are back indicating that they again 
expect him to talk. But the second Miranda warnings in this 
case remove all possibility of any confusion on the part of 
Mosley . He was told again, immediately before he confessed, 
that he still had the right to remain silent. 
Mosley raised a Wong Sun issue in the Michigan courts 
based on the alleged unconstitutionality of his arrest. The 
state court of appeals (whose opinion we are reviewing) did 
not discuss it, and Mosley raised but did not press it in his 
brief,~ Resp. Brief at 17-18. But Brown v. Illinois was ~ 
1 
.JL 
decided after the briefs were filed, and you can bet Mosley l~ l 
will press the Wong Sun point at oral argument. 
The first question is whether he can raise it here when 
the state court never discussed it. My understanding is that 
he can, since he appears to have preserved it throughout the 
state proceedings. See Resp. Brief at 10-11. The state court 
did not suggest that the point was not properly before it, 
but only that the court did not reach it because the Miranda 
point was dispositive. Cert. Petn at 11. 
Since it appears to have been based on one anonymous 
phone tip, the arrest probably fails to pass constitutional 
muster for lack of probable cause. Assuming that it was 
indeed unconstitutional, Brown v. Illinois makes this a tough 
case. majority found that the taint had not 
-
• 
-
-
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dissipated because (1) the unconstitutionality of the arrest 
was in a sense "purposeful" because it was undertaken purely 
for investigatory reasons (slip op. at 14); (2) the arrest 
and the confession were separated by less than two hours (id.); 
(3) there was no intervening event of significance (id.). It's 
----, 
not easy to distinguish this case: (1) From the facts set 
out in the briefs, it appears that the arrest of Mosley was 
knowingly effected without probable cause and for purposes of 
investigation. The only information linking Mosley to any 
crimes was an anonymous phone call a day or two earlier. 
Petr. Brief at 4 n. 3. Moreover, Cowie testified that he 
didn't think he had enough information to get a warrant. 
See 
-
See Resp. Brief at 5-6. Anthony Smith's statement implicating 
Mosley in the murder, which would have helped the police to 
.for' 
show probable cause a the arrest, apparently was not obtained 
until after Mosley's arrest. See Resp. Brief at 8 (recounting 
Sergeant Hill's testimony that he spoke to Smith at least 
three hours after Mosley's arrest). It looks like·, both 
Mosley and Smith (who had also been named by the anonymous 
caller) were rounded up in the same investigative dragnet. 
See id. at 6-7. (2) Mosley's confession was approximately 
5-1/2 hours after his arrest, a ccording to the Michigan court. 
Cert Petn at 12. That's at least 3-1/2 hours longer than 
in Brown, but how much can be made of that difference is 
anyone's guess. (3) I can point to no intervening circumstance 
of any significance. All that happened between time of arrest 
--
8. 
and time of confession was that Mosley refused to talk and 
cooled his heels in a hostile environment. (If anything, it 
can be argued with some force that the longer the time between 
arrest and confession the less likely it is that the taint of 
the illegal arrest will dissipate, if the time is spent in 
custody at the stationhouse - the arrestee is likely to grow 
more intimidated by the minute. In this situation, 5~1/2 
hours may be worse than the "less than two hours" in Brown 
v. Illinois). Certainly there was no intervening circum-
stance of the kind present in Wong Sun where Wong Sun was 
released and then returned voluntarily several days later to 
make a statement. 
Because this case is so hard, if not impossible, to 
distinguish from Brown on the Wong Sun point, I think you 
will have a good chance of convincing the Conference to do 
what you wanted them to do in Brown - remand to the state courts 
for some fact-finding on the issue. No court during this 
entire litigatio~ has focused on the issues of the 
constitutionality of the arrest or the dissipation of the 
taint, if any. In Brown, there had been at least some attention 
to the point below. (The trial court had made no finding 
as to the arrest, but the state supreme court had reviewed the 
record and found absence of probabl~ cause. Slip op. at 6.) 
And there has certainly been no attention to the question of 
the officers' good faith in making the arrest without probable 
cause. (Given Cowie's testimony that he did not believe he 
.. . 
• 
-
-
- 9 • 
had sufficient infonnation to get a warrant, it may be tough 
for the state to show or even argue good faith, but it should 
get some chance to do so.) Especially disturbing in this case 
is that the parties have not had a chance to brief the Wong 
Sun issue in light of Brown. Given all this, the Court would 
be well advised to limit its consideration to the main issue 
presented by the opinion of the Michigan court, and then 
(assuming reversal on that issue) remand to the state courts 
for consideration of the Wong Sun issue. 
Finally, a short word on the last argument in Respondent's 
Brief, at 42-44. As I understand it, Mosley argues that 
Michigan has "taken over" the Miranda rules as part of its 
own constitutional and statutory law, and then in addition 
gone farther in interpreting its own Miranda-influenced 
constitution and laws than this Court might go in interpreting 
Miranda itself. Stated differently, Miranda's federal 
constitutional standards were the impetus for the Michigan 
court's decision, but the decision really rested on its 
interpretation of state law. 
The upshot of Mosley's argument is that this Court cannot 
reverse the Michigan court unless it can be certain that that 
court's decision was not founded upon state law in the manner 
(attempted to be) explained above. Well, the Michigan court 
cited no state constitutional provision or statute. It did 
.. ,• • I ~ 
• 
-
-
- - 10. 
cite Miranda and quoted from it. It cited one state case 
(People v. Robinson), but I have read that case and it seems 
to be based on Miranda too. (It was cited by the Michigan court 
here only for a collateral point anyway - that the appellate 
court must independently determine voluntariness of a statement.) 
I just cannot understand how Mosley can contend that the decision 
below was based on anything but federal constitutional principles 
derived from Miranda. That being the case, Justice Blackmun's 
statement in Oregon v. Hass (decided 3/19/75)* takes care of 
any assertion that the state court can interpret the federal 
Constitution any more restrictively against the police than 
does this Court. 
P.J. 
ss 
,._.Hass suggests that "when state law is more res t rictive against 
the prosecution than federal law, this Court has no power 
"to compel a state to conform to federal law." . •. This, 
apparently, is proferred as a reference to our expressions 
that a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose 
greater restrictions on police activity than those this 
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional 
standards •..• But, of course, a State may not impose such 
greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law 
when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them. 
Oregon v . Hass, slip op, at 5 (emphasis in original) . 
--
-
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tate of Michigan, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to 
v, the Court of Appeals of 
Richard Bert Mosley, Michigan. 
[December -, 1975] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, concurring. 
I concur in the result and in much of the majority's 
reasoning. However, it appears to me that, in an effort 
to make only a limited holding in this case, the majority 
has implied that some custodial confessions~-
presse even o ey o ow an mformea and vo1uii-
iary wai~t's rights':'" Th-;- majority 
seems to say tha a statement obtained within some un-
specified time after an assertion by an individual of his 
"right to silence" is always inadmissible, even if it was 
the result of an informed and voluntary decision-fol-
lowing, for example, a disclosure to such an individual 
of a piece of information bearing on his waiver decision 
which the police had failed to give him prior to his as-
sertion of the privilege but which they gave him immedi-
ately thereafter. Indeed, at p. 6, the majority character-
izes as "absurd" any contrary rule. I disagree, I don't 
think the majority's conclusion is compelled by Miranda 
. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and I suspect that in the final ! 
analysis the majority will adopt voluntariness as the 
standard by which to judge the waiver of the right to 
silence by a properly informed defendant. I think the 
Court should szy ~ now. 
Mi~a holds that custody creates an inherent com-
pulsion on an individual to incriminate himself in re-
sponse to questions, and that statements obtained under 
such circumstances are therefore obtained in violation 
-2 
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of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled 
testimonial self-incrimination unless the privilege is 
"knowingly and intelligently waived." Id., at 471 , 475. 
It also holds that an inqividual will not be deemed to 
have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his "right 
to silence" unless the authorities have first informed him, 
inter alia, of that right-"the threshold requirement for 
an intelligent decision as to its exercise. )) Id., at 468. 
I am no more convinced that Miranda was required by the 
United States Constitution than I was when it was de-
cided. However, there is at least some support in the 
law both before and after Miranda for the proposition 
that some rights will never be deemed ' waived unless 
the defendant is first expressly advised of their existence. 
E. g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506; Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U. S. 238; Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11; Fed. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 32 (a ) (2) . There is little support in/ 
the law or in commonsense for the proposition that an 
informed waiver of a right may be ineffective even where 
voluntarily made. Indeed, the law is exactly to the con-
trary, e. g., Tollett v. H enderJon, 411 U. S. 258; Brady v. 
United States, 397 U. S. 742; McMann v. Richardson, 
397 U. S. 759:; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U. S. 790. 
Unless an individual is incompetent, we have in the past 
rejected any paternalistic rule protecting a d~fendant 
from his intelligent and voluntary decisions about his 
own criminal case. Faretta v. California, 43 U. S. L. W. 
5005. To do so would be to "imprison a man in his priv-
ileges," 1 Adams ex rel. McCann v. United States, 317 
1 The maJority's rule may cause an accused injury. Although a 
recently arrested individual may have indicated an initial desire 
not to answer questions, he would nonetheless want to know im-
mediately-if 1t were true-that his abiiity to explain a particular 
incrimmating fact or to supply an alibi for a particular time period 
would result m his JIIlmediate release. Similarly, he might wish to 
know~ 1£ 't were trne-that (1} the case against him was unusually 
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U. S. 269, 280, and to disregard " 'the respect for the in-
dividual which is · the lifeblood of the law,' " Faretta v, 
California, at 5012. I am very reluctant to conclude 
that Miranda stands for such a proposition. 
The language of Miranda no more compels such a re-
sult than does its basic rationale. As the majority points 
out, the statement in Miranda, at 474,. requiring interro-
gation to cease after an assertion of the "right to silence" 
tells us nothing because it does not indicate how soon this 
interrogation 111ay resume. The Court showed in the 
very next paragraph, moreover, that when it wanted to 
create a per se rule against further interrogation after 
assertion of a right, it knew how to do so. The Court 
there said "if the individual indicates that he wants an 
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney 
is present." Id., at 474.2 However, when the individual 
strong and (2) that his immediate cooperation with the authorities 
in the apprehension and conviction of others or in the recovery of 
property would redound to his benefit in the form of a reduced 
charge. Certainly the individual's lawyer, if he had one, would be 
interested in such information, even if communication of such infor-
mation followed closely on an assertio11 of the "right to silence." 
Where the individual has not requested counsel and has chosen 
instead to make his own decisions regarding his conversations with 
the authorities, he should not be deprived even temporarily of any 
information relevant to the decision. 
2 The question of the proper procedure following expression by an 
individual of his desire to consult counsel is not presented in this 
case. It is sufficient to note that the reasons to keep the lines of 
communication between the authorities and the accused open when 
the accused has chosen to make his own decisions are not present 
when he indicates instead that he wishes legal advise with respect 
thereto. The authorities may then communicate with him through 
an attorney. More to the point, the accused having expressed his 
own view that he 1s not competent to deal with the authorities 
without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities ' insistance 
t o make a statement without counsel 's presence may properly be 
viewed with skepticism, 
4 
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indicates th~t he will decide unaided by counsel whether 
or not to assert his "right to silence" the situation is dif~ 
ferent. In such a situation, the Court in Miranda simply 
said, "if the interrogation continues without the presence 
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden 
rests on the Government to demonstrate that the de-
fendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege 
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or 
appointed counsel." Id. , at 475. Apparently, although 
placing a heavy burden on the Government, Miranda 
intended waiver of the "right to silence" to be tested by 
the normal • standards. In any event, insofar as the 
Miranda decision might be read to require interrogation 
to cease for some magical and unspecified period of time 
following an assertion of the' "right to silence," and to 
reject voluntariness as the standard by which to judge 
informed waivers of that right, it should be disapproved 
as inconsistent with otherwise uniformly applied legal 
principles. 
In justifying the implication that questioning must 
inevitably cease for some unspecified period of time 
following an exercise of the '.'right to silence," the ma-
jority says only that such a requirement would be neces-
sary to avoid '(undermining" "the will of the person being 
questioned." Yet surely a waiver of the "right to si-
lence" obtained by "undermining the will" of the person 
being questioned would be considered an involuntary 
waiver. Thus, in order to achieve the majority's only 
stated purpose, it is sufficient to exclude all confessions 
which are the result of involuntary waivers. To ex-
clude any others is to deprive the factfinding process of 
highly probative information for no reason at all. The 
" repeated rounds" of questioning following an assertion 
of the privilege, which the majority is worried about~ 
would, of course, count heavily against the State in any 
-14-653-C0NeUR 
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determination of voluntariness-particularly if no reason 
(such as new facts communicated to the accused or a new 
incident being inquired about) appeared for repeated 
questioning. There is no reason, however, to rob the 
accused of the choice to answer questions voluntarily for 
some magical period of time following his own previous 
contrary decision. The Court should now so state. 
-C H A M B ERS Of" 
-
~uprttttt Q+ttu:rf 1lf uti- ~tit ~tauo 
'lUasJringfon. lfl. QI. 20~)!._;l ✓ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL November 18. 1975 
Re: . No . 74-653 - - State of Michigan v. Richard Bert Mosley 
D ear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely. 
-;:ff ' / {/ /'( 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
-CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
.Snpunu C!}itltrl of tqt 'J!lnruh .$)hut.tr 
:JfasJrngLm, ~. QI. 2llffeJ!.~ 
December 1, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re : No. 74-653, Michigan v. Mosley 
/ 
This opinion will not be announced this week. I did 
not see Bill Brennanvs substantially revised dissenting opinion 
until Saturday. I contemplate adding a couple of footnotes to 
the Court opinion responding to his dissent, and did not want to 
get t~e print shop involved in overtime. 
n Cb · 
.I I ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN , JR. 
• .§np-rtmt <Q:o-ud of tqt ~tti±t?t .§tattg 
'JJJ,u;qmghm. 1I}. (Q:. 20~J.l., 
December 4, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No~ 74-653 Michigan v. Mosley 
In the first sentence of the second paragraph 
on page 6, "appointment" should be changed to "presence." 
W.J.B. Jr. 
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